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Abstract The relational interpretation of quantum mechanics proposes to
solve the measurement problem and reconcile completeness and locality of
quantum mechanics by postulating relativity to the observer for events and
facts, instead of an absolute “view from nowhere”. The aim of this paper is to
clarify this interpretation, and in particular, one of its central claims concern-
ing the possibility for an observer to have knowledge about other observer’s
events. I consider three possible readings of this claim (deflationist, relation-
ist and relativist), and develop the most promising one, relativism, to show
how it fares when confronted with the traditional interpretative problems of
quantum mechanics. Although it provides answers to some problems, I claim
that there is currently no adapted locality criterion to evaluate whether the
resulting interpretation is local or not.
Keywords Relational Quantum Mechanics · Bell’s theorem · Locality ·
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Carlo Rovelli has proposed an interpretation of quantum mechanics, which
he has dubbed relational quantum mechanics (RQM) (Rovelli, 1996; Smerlak
Rovelli, 2007). Rovelli claims that this interpretation solves the measurement
problem while preserving both the locality and completeness of quantum me-
chanics, all this without additional structure nor many-worlds. This is a bold
claim: how is this possible? By positing that the states quantum mechanics
describes are relative to the observer rather than absolute. We should abandon
the idea that there is a “view from nowhere”, and all our worries will be put
at ease.
The idea is inspired by Mermin (1998)’s view that quantum mechanics
is a “theory of relations without relata”, and by Everett’s relative state for-
mulation. More recently, Bene Dieks (2002) developed a perspectival modal
interpretation of quantum mechanics which also assumes relative states, al-
though they are exploited differently. Healey (2012)’s pragmatist approach
also share some similarities. Rovelli’s interpetation has been discussed, among
others, by Dorato (2013); Bitbol (2010); Van Fraassen (2010); Dieks (2009);
Brown (2009); Laudisa (2001). However it remains a minority view, and the
fact that it is not clear to everyone what the interpretation says exactly might
be part of the reasons why.
This paper is an attempt to make things more clear. I expose RQM’s on-
tology and its interpretation of theoretical structures in the first section. In
the second section, I examine one of its central claims: the idea that we could
know when a measurement occurs. The claim is somehow ambiguous in Rov-
elli’s writings, and I propose three possible readings of it. In the third section,
I develop the most promising option, and show, in the fourth section, how it
fares when faced with the traditional conundrums of quantum mechanics: the
EPR argument and Bell’s inequalities.
1 Ontology and predictions
RQM can be primarly characterised as being commited to an ontology of
“observers”, measurement interactions and relative events1, and by adopting
an instrumentalist stance towards theoretical structures.
According to RQM, in the world, there are observers. These are not nec-
essarily human observers, but any physical object, such as a measuring appa-
ratus, would qualify2. During a measurement interaction with another object,
an observer witnesses an event (a discrete, occurrent entity) corresponding
to this object having a determinate property relative to the observer (these
properties are not necessarily finely grained physical quantities: it can be a
macroscopic aggregated quantity, or, for example, position with a finite de-
gree of precision). Quantum mechanics is what allows an observer (supposedly
1 “In RQM, physical reality is taken to be formed by the individual quantum events
(facts) through which interacting systems affect one another. [. . . ] each quantum event is
only relative to the system involved in the interaction.”(Smerlak Rovelli, 2007, p.2)
2 “any physical system provides a potential observer” (Smerlak Rovelli, 2007, p. 2).
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a human observer, capable of storing information, making inferences, under-
standing physics, etc.) to make probabilistic predictions about future events
on the basis of past and present events. But events are all relative to the
observer, and different observers can have different descriptions of the same
objects. This aspect is presented by Rovelli as an extension of the principle of
relativity: not only lengths and durations are relative, but also the determinacy
and value of properties.
As for the interpretation of theoretical structures, the idea is that the the-
ory provides universal, objective rules that can be applied by any observer to
make their predictions (this is what Van Fraassen (2010) calls a “transcen-
dental approach”). So the way the rules work should be explained by taking
the perspective of an observer. I propose to understand predictions in terms
of events that could be witnessed by one of the potential future-selves of an
observer.
I will follow Smerlak Rovelli’s suggestion, and adopt the Heisenberg pic-
ture of quantum mechanics, wherein wave-functions do not evolve with time,
but observables do. In this picture, the wave-function can be seen as encod-
ing past and present events that the observer has witnessed3 and evolving
operators can be associated with potential future-selves of the observer per-
forming a specific measurement at a specific time. The Born rule allows the
observer to derive probabilities that some events would be witnessed by a po-
tential future-self doing a measurement corresponding to an operator. Since
the predicted measurement outcomes for different observables correspond to
determinate values that are relative to different future-selves, and therefore
are never combined into a single description, the usual paradoxes of quantum
mechanics do not arise.
If the observer actually does a measurement, then it will witness a new
event and its wave-function will “collapse”. But this does not mean that a
physical change occurs, apart from the instantiation of an event: it merely
means that the observer, having gained new information, can update its rep-
resentation4. Quantum mechanics tells us how to build wave-functions from
acquired information, and this is also valid for future-O: what future-O is do-
ing is merely building a new wave-function from the information it has just
acquired. One could express it this way: the wave-function changes because
3 “The state Ψ that we associate with a system S is therefore, first of all, just a coding
of the outcome of these previous interactions with S.” (Smerlak Rovelli, 2007, p.3) Note,
however, that the idea that the wave-function merely encodes past events is not strictly true:
it also incorporates a predictive content, in particular when updated after a “collapse”. For
example, when measuring one of two entangled particles, the properties of the second one
are updated too, even though it is not directly measured and corresponds to no new event
for the observer. Therefore it should count as a prediction encoded in the wave-function
that concerns a future observer capable of having information on the distant particle (this
is explicit in Smerlak Rovelli (2007)’s treatment of EPR).
4 “What changes instantaneously at time t0 , for A, is not the objective state of β, but
only its (subjective) relative state, that codes the information that A has about β” (Smerlak
Rovelli, 2007, p. 5)
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O has just became a new observer with a new perspective, relative to which
objects have different properties.
What the observer will measure in the future and at what time it will wit-
ness an event is not part of the predictions of the observer itself. This is because
the observer is not part of its own representation, and doesn’t have the same
information about itself that it has about other objects (as we shall see in the
following, an external observer might be able to make these predictions). For
this reason, predictions must be conditionalised to potential measurements,
and they should not strictly count as unconditioned probabilisitc knowledge
of future events, because no probability is associated to different possible mea-
surements. What these predictions are, and what the corresponding laws and
operators represent, will mostly depend on the interpretation of probabilities
one adopts. Smerlak Rovelli (2007) claim that a subjective interpretation is
required for RQM, i.e. that probabilities would merely correspond to degrees
of credence, but Dorato (2013) suggests instead a dispositional interpretation,
where events have dispositions to produce other events, and measurements
are the stimulus. An alternative dispositional account, more in line with the
Heisenberg picture, would be to interpret operators at any time as disposi-
tional entities, attributed to the interaction between the observer and the ob-
ject, whose stimulus and manifestations are events. I will remain uncommited
on this issue.
As we can see, the theory entertains a form of relativism about events and
properties, but I think its general ontological claims (“what the world is like”
according to RQM) should be understood as being absolutely true in order to
avoid the self-refutation problems associated with relativism, and the relativist
stance should be reserved to statements about particular entities or facts in
the world.
RQM is sometimes classified as a collapse interpretation, but I think it is
better classified among the multiverse theories in Maudlin (1995)’s terminol-
ogy (which becomes a misnomer, since RQM does not postulate multiple uni-
verses), i.e. theories that deny that experiments have determinate outcomes.
This is because the collapse postulate is not introduced as a means to com-
plete the dynamics of the theory5: according to RQM, the wave-function and
the dynamics are complete relative to the observer. The wave-function does
not give determinate outcomes because these outcomes do not exist (yet) rel-
ative to the observer, they only exist relative to potential future observers
(whereas in many-worlds, they exist relative to actual future observers in dif-
ferent branches). So the interpretation shares more affinities with Everett’s
relative state formulation (as Rovelli acknowledges) than with, say, GRW.
To finish this exposition, let me warn that all this narrative should be
taken with a grain of salt. The notion of observation used in science, associ-
ated with sophisticated controlled measurements, is certainly different from
5 Rovelli gives, as a rationale for the collapse, that acquiring new information involves
interacting with the system, which breaks the linear dynamic. But this is somehow mislead-
ing: dynamics, in the sense of laws of nature governing the phenomena, need not be involved
if wave-functions are mere bookkeeping devices.
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the notion of subjective observation philosophers entertain, and to my knowl-
edge, RQM does not pretend to take position in the philosophy of mind6.
Arguably, when scientists apply quantum mechanics, they do not make claims
or predictions about what they observe as individuals: they make claims about
robust, theory-laden scientific reports, and they talk on behalf of their measur-
ing apparatus. They don’t base their predictions solely on “past events”, but
rather on a sophisticated practical and technical knowledge that allows them
to produce suitable controlled environments that they can associate with theo-
retical models. The idea that the measurement of physical quantities could be
translated by systematic and non-contextual rules into first-person reports is
very naive (we’ve now known this for almost a century) and it is unnecessary
to do science (see for example Bogen Woodward, 1988). But digging into the
philosophy of experimentation would take us much too far. RQM needs only
assume that an experimenter doing a scientific report has indirect knowledge
of a physical event relative to an apparatus in her neighbourhood, which is not
so unreasonable. For the sake of the presentation, I will stick to the idealistic
scheme and simply talk about observers directly observing physical quantities
at specific times.
2 Other observers
According to this minimal interpretation, quantum mechanics is certainly a lo-
cal theory. It is even trivially local: after all, all events it predicts are attached
to the observer, which is at the center of its own reference frame, and distant
events simply do not exist. Representation of distant objects is purely instru-
mental: it serves the purpose of predicting future local events. Non-locality
arguments, such as Bell’s, are a non-starter: even if quantum mechanics al-
lowed observers to act instantaneously on distant objects (under standard
interpretations), the theory would still be local! But the theory also looks like
a solipsist version of instrumentalism. From the perspective of an observer,
other observers don’t really need to exist qua observers.
The (explanatory?) role of RQM’s ontology would be unclear without fur-
ther postulates: what is the point of introducing an ontology of observers,
where all objects are on a par, if all they can do is make predictions in their
own corners? Furthermore, as human beings, we never witness events directly
corresponding to physical properties (at least not without a good scientific
training!), so shouldn’t we be able to talk meaningfully about events occuring
from the perspective of our measuring apparatus? There seem to be a tension
between Rovelli’s naturalistic stance, which motivates the interpretation, and
the radical relativism it entertains.
However, Rovelli introduces an ingredient that can help us escape this
dire situation: the possibility of knowledge about external events. The idea is
the following: if, during a measurement interaction described by an exernal
6 Although it would definitely be compatible with a panpsychist, or panexperientialist
position.
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observer, the properties of two objects are correlated, then the measuring
object has witnessed an event corresponding to its object having a determinate
value for the measured property. It is even possible for the external observer to
predict (probabilistically) the time at which the event occurs (Rovelli, 1998).
These correspond to well-defined observables in quantum mechanics that the
observer can measure. So, one does not have to be a solipsist. Even better: we
now have a way to fill the gap of traditional collapse interpretations, since an
external observer can tell when the collapse occurs.7
What Rovelli provides, here, is apparently a new interpretational rule from
which an observer can interpret its measurement, so as to attribute to other
objects what happens to itself (events). Of course, the rule itself is not some-
thing we could learn by experience and corresponds to no observable of the
theory, so it has to be part of the universal claims of the interpretation. But
its status is unclear, and three readings are possible:
Relationism: external events are real (asymmetric) relations between two ob-
jects, just as the events an observer witnesses are real relations between it
and an external object.
Relativism: external events are relations between two objects, but they merely
exist relative to the observer that infer them from its measurements.
Deflationism: external events merely correspond to the fact, for the observer,
to have a given outcome for a specific measurement on other objects.
Relationism is not prima facie a bad option: it is rather intuitive. It is a
straightforward way to escape instrumentalism. The main problem is that it
reintroduces non-locality. Typically, in an EPR experiment, one can predict
that a distant event will be correlated with a local event, and if these events
are real, then Bell’s inequalities can be formulated and, as in standard quan-
tum mechanics, they will be violated. However it is not irrational to accept
this. One could argue along these lines: quantum theory is primarily a theory
about events witnessed by a single observer, and this theory is (trivially) local,
but a metaphysical layer allows us to postulate external events on top of our
representations, and although this layer is non-local, it does not really matter
because it is metaphysical and corresponds to no predictions.
The resulting view would not come very far from the perspectival modal
interpretation (PMI) (Bene Dieks, 2002) which is also commited to relative
states. The main difference is that PMI postulates continuously evolving states
instead of events, and relies on the bi-orthonormal decomposition to attribute a
determinate relative state to any object at any instant, while RQM apparently
relies on a fixed set of properties associated with types of systems to know what
is measured.8 In RQM, the wave-function plays a more instrumental role, and
7 There might be a “preferred basis” problem here. What counts as a measuring interac-
tion, and what doesn’t? Are there objective criteria to tell, and are they sufficient to select
a unique property that is measured? However, I will leave these issues aside.
8 According to Rovelli, bi-orthonormal decomposition is irrelevant because associated ob-
servables would generally correspond to an “uninteresting and practically non measurable
quantity”, while we are interested in “certain self-adjoint operators only, representing ob-
servables that we know how to measure” (Rovelli, 1996).
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state-relativity is addressed differently9. However, under this reading, both
interpretations would be commited to relational entities between objects, and
be compatible with a (structural) realist stance (see Ladyman Ross, 2007, p.
188)).
In any case, Smerlak Rovelli (2007) explicitely reject relationism: there
cannot be absolute facts; everything (presumably concerning particulars) should
be evaluated from a given perspective. One should not attempt to combine the
views of different observers in a single picture. Although very clear on this,
they remain somehow ambiguous on the right way to understand this new
principle and oscillate in their writings between the two remaining options.
Let us examine deflationism first. I would say that it amounts to adopt
a pragmatic evaluation of statements concerning other observers: in line with
the theory of truth developed in the pragmatist tradition of Peirce and James,
these statements should be evaluated in terms of their practical success for
an agent, relative to the intentions of the agent. In the narrow context of
physics, practical success is predictive success, and the intentions of the agent
could correspond to the measurement she intents to perform. In this context,
the interpretational rule given above can be seen as some kind of meaning
postulate for the terms “event” and “measurement” when applied to external
objects: it tells us how to evaluate, pragmatically, statements about other
observers. And this is all there is to understand about these statements.
Note that a measurement need not be actually performed for the corre-
sponding statement to be pragmatically true: it suffices that it could have
been performed at the time and that the result would be obtained with cer-
tainty, because then, its truth directly follows from information the observer
already has10. The view is not a pure verificationism (the deficiencies of which
are well known). However, there is nothing that the statements about other
observers say beyond these potential measurement results.
I don’t think that deflationism is really tenable. First, it looks a bit as
if we have been tricked by Rovelli’s rhetoric: RQM seemed, at first sight, to
offer new perspectives for interpreting quantum theory, but at the end, all we
are left with is measurement results. These other observers witnessing events:
that was just a way of talking. Despite all appearences, the additional rule
does not really claim that the external events inferred from a representation
and the events directly witnessed by an observer share a common nature. Not
only does it seem to contradict the naturalistic stance endorsed by Rovelli, but
this poses an epistemological problem, as noted above: since human observers
9 PMI assumes relativity to a reference, which is a system containing the described system,
while RQM assumes that it is a separate system (however PMI takes the complement of the
reference to be the “perspective”, and this is a separate system). This means that in PMI,
an object can have a state relative to itself, that the universe has a state relative to itself,
and that any object has a state relative to any perspective, which is not the case in RQM.
10 This is clear in RQM when Rovelli analyses the observable corresponding to a measure-
ment apparatus being correlated with a measured object: the expected probability is 1, from
which he concludes that the apparatus has measured the object, without requiring that the
observer actually performs the measurement. This observation is analog to the principle of
reality involved in the EPR argument, that will be examined below.
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never witness physical properties directly, and since we have no systematic
rule to associate our subjective observations to them, shouldn’t scientists be
able to talk about events that are relative to their apparatus? And finally, the
way locality problems are solved is rather trivial, as also noted above: what
would count as non-locality with such an interpretation?
In the end, RQM thus understood does not seem to be distinctive as com-
pared to, for example, QBism. QBism is the view that quantum mechanics is
not a theory about the world, but about our degrees of credence concerning
predictions. The theory provides universal, objective rules for updating these
degrees from the information one gets on the world through events. All this is
shared by RQM. One difference is that QBism is human-centered, while RQM
is not: any physical object qualifies as a potential observer. But what remains
of it if all talk of external observers boils down to talk of events relative to us?
If anything, RQM is more radically instrumentalist than QBism: after all, the
latter assumes that events are objective and publicly accessible. . .
For these reasons, I think we should take seriously the idea that observers
really know about external events. The interpretative rule Rovelli provides
really tells us how to interpret our measurements, and if observers each can
assume this rule, then they should really talk about other observers, not merely
about their future observations. I think this is essential to do justice to the
naturalistic stance (according to which all objects are on a par) that Rovelli
mentions to motivate his interpretation. Adopting this reading also allows one
to defuse some of the intuitive arguments against RQM. For example, Laudisa
(2017) cites Wigner, who argued that it would be absurd to think that a friend
that we represent in a superposition of state within an experimental situation
has not witnessed a determinate outcome. But with this reading, this is not
exactly what RQM says.
So if neither relationism nor deflationism is the right way to interpret
RQM, only one option remains: relativism. In this option, it is true, from the
perspective of a given observer, that other observers witness events, and these
events are indeed of the same nature as the ones the observer directly witness.
This makes the interpretation distinct from an instrumentalism. However, all
this is true relative to an observer, and this could help RQM keep its promises:
being at the same time complete and local, without the many-worlds.
In what follows, I will assume that this is the right way of understanding
RQM and examine how far one can go with it.
3 Relativism
The idea of the relativist option can be expressed as follows: basic facts about
events witnessed by an observer allows it to deduce more extended facts about
the world; these facts are not equivalent to the basic facts from which they are
deduced: they say more than the basic facts (thanks to the interpretational
rules given by RQM); however, these facts are not absolutely true, but only
true relative to the observer, as are the basic facts form which they were
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deduced. This is the characteristic captured by the slogan: “there is no view
from nowhere”. So in a sense, we have a double relativity when it comes to
events witnessed by other observers: these events are relative to the other
observer, relative to the first observer.
This relativity extends to predictions in the following way: if quantum
theory allows an observer O to predict future events, then the basic facts
concerning these events are relative to a potential future-self of O, and the
prediction also concerns the extended facts that could be deduced from these
basic facts, but these are also relative to the potential future-self of O. And
the predictions are relative to O-now.
Relativism differs from deflationism in the following way: arguments re-
garding locality or completeness need not be applied to basic facts only; they
can also be applied to extended facts that concern distant objects, taken at
face value, and, possibly, there would be a well-defined sense of “locality” in
this interpretation, and quantum theory would pass the test.
This option can be captured by adopting a relativist conception of truth,
where truth is a two place predicate indexed to an observer. This also applies
to second-order statements, such as “p is true-for-O”: this statement only has
a truth-value relative to an observer (be it O or another). Let us assume the
following principles:
Basic facts principle: If an observer O can predict with certainty the outcome
of a measurement that it could perform at t, then there is a corresponding
basic fact (given the interpretational rules of standard quantum mechanics)
for O at t (even if O did not actually perform the measurement).
Extended facts principle: If an extended fact can be deduced (with the inter-
pretational rules of RQM) from basic facts that are true for O at t, then
it is true for O at t.
Disquotational truth principle: from the perspective of O, “ p is true-for-O”
is equivalent to p.
But now here is a puzzle: if, taking the perspective of O, it is true-for-P that
S has a determinate spin-x, and assuming that possible values for spin-x are −1
and +1, then, as a matter of pure logic, it is either true-for-P that S’s spin-x is
−1, or it is true-for-P that S’s spin-x is +1. Indeed, we do not mean that P has
witnessed a disjunction of values for the property, but that P has witnessed
one of the two. But none of the statements in the disjunction correspond to
basic facts for O, so if quantum theory is complete, they must both be false-for-
O, and their disjunction is false as well! Assuming an ignorance interpretation
of probabilities for our two statements would ruin the whole story, since all
the paradoxes of quantum mechanics would show their ugly face again. But
then, we cannot claim that P has seen a determinate property for S, in pain
of contradiction.
So how can a disjunction be true-for-O while all of its terms are false-for-
O? Perhaps its terms could be neither true- nor false-for-O, rather than false.
It seems that the relativist must drop the bivalence of truth to accomodate
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its position11. This, somehow, makes sense: after all, relative truth means
something like “knowledge” (or “having information on”) in RQM, and there
is no contradiction in knowing that a football team has either won or lost
the match without knowing the final result. RQM only takes a more robust
approach towards this, by forbidding an ignorance interpretation. One would
not want to revise classical logic too much to accomodate this, but formally,
this can be done with modal operators (so for example, we can have (p ∨ q)
and ¬p and ¬q without contradiction, and in this context, the disquotational
property of truth is a theorem of modal logic: p→ p). I won’t explore this any
further, but it’s important to note that the way to make sense of this option
is not trivial, and other difficulties that were not mentioned here might arise.
One should be careful when establishing the rules that allow an observer to
infer extended facts.
In any case, this relativist aspect (which is also present in the deflationist
view, although it doesn’t encounter the difficulty just mentioned) has sprung
lots of discussions, in particular in Van Fraassen (2010) and Brown (2009).
This is the most counter-intuitive part. Couldn’t it be true-for-O that “it is
true-for-P that p”, but false-for-P that p? There seem to be no contradiction,
but it would be as if O and P lived in different worlds, without any constraint
between these worlds. Certainly, if the theory permits that, it is absurd (or at
least not very far from a many-world interpretation). But according to RQM,
these statements have no meaning if not evaluated from an observer’s perspec-
tive, and if we take, for example, O’s perspective, they become contradictory
(assuming the disquotational principle), so our absurd situation is excluded.
The rules of quantum mechanics also ensure that it cannot arise from a third
observer’s perspective either. One could legitimately remain unsatisfied, and
crave for absolute facts. But Rovelli urges us, citing Wittgenstein, to take a
quietist approach towards this.
Yet without any “transcendental” constraints on what different observers
see, it is not clear in what sense they can be said to describe the “same”
situation differently, as explained by the main narrative of Rovelli (1996)’s
presentation: what is “the same”? Van Fraassen (2010) proposed some addi-
tional principles to tame this disconfort. In our context, this would amount
to requiring that if something is true-for-O, then it cannot be false-for-O′,
where O′ is any system containing O (van Fraassen expresses this in terms of
orthogonality of relative states): this ensures a transcendental coherence be-
tween what different observers observe. The problem is that these statements
are already true in quantum mechanics, from the perspective of any observer
and given the relativist interpretational rules of RQM12. In any case, the whole
picture is still relativist.
I won’t dwell on whether one can make sense of the couterintuitive, radical
relativism of RQM, and accept it for the sake of argumentation. In the follow-
11 Ladyman Ross (2007, p. 188) claims that RQM requires intuitionist logic.
12 Perhaps they could allow inferences concerning what is possibly true for an external
observer, in a way that is not already allowed by the rules given by Rovelli. This remains to
be examined.
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ing, I rather wish to focus on an easier question: is RQM, thus formulated, a
complete and local theory? In order to answer this question, I will examine in
turn the EPR argument and Bell’s inequalities.
4 The locality and completeness of RQM
The EPR argument is an argument to the effect that quantum mechanics is
necessarily an incomplete theory. It rests on a few postulates: separability,
locality, and the principle of reality, which is a criterion for assessing that
there are “elements of reality”: if an observer knows, without interacting with
a system, that a measurement would yield a given result with certainty, then
there is an element of reality corresponding to it. This is very close to our
principle for basic facts above.
An informal version of the argument (in a classical context) runs as follows:
1. Assume an entangled pair of particles a and b, such that the sum of their
spin in either direction must be 0 at the end of an experiment. Assume two
observers O and P separated by a space-like interval that can measure the
spin of a and b in any direction. O measures the spin-x of a and obtain a
determinate result.
2. In this situation, the result of a measurement of the spin-x of b by P would
give an opposite result with certainty.
3. If this is so, then according to the principle of reality, there is an element
of reality corresponding to b having a determinate value for spin-x.
4. Given locality and separability, this element of reality is not caused by O’s
measurement, and it would have existed even if O hadn’t performed the
measurement.
5. O could have measured spin-y, and the same reasoning entails that there is
an element of reality corresponding to b having a determinate spin-y. Given
separability, this element of reality must exist even if O did not perform
this measurement.
6. Then there are elements of reality corresponding to b having a determinate
spin-x, and to b having a determinate spin-y.
7. But quantum mechanics precludes a particle having both a determinate
spin-x and spin-y. Therefore, quantum mechanics is incomplete.
The premise of the argument that RQM denies is, of course, the criterion
for assessing that there are elements of reality (contra Laudisa, 2017): despite
their similarities, it is different from our principle about basic facts, because
for RQM, facts are relative to the observer rather than absolutely true.
Now here is how the relativistic stance of RQM allows one to defuse the
argument: taking the perspective of O, and even assuming that b has a deter-
minate spin-x for O measuring spin-x and that b has a determinate spin-y for
O measuring spin-y, these are different potential observers, and they cannot
both exist. So it is not true, for any actual observer, that b has both a deter-
minate spin-x and a determinate spin-y, and there is no reason to think that
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quantum mechanics is incomplete. It can well be complete, in the sense that
it would describe all properties objects have relative to a given perspective.
As we can see, RQM indeed provides an answer to the EPR argument. A
further observation, that will be important for the following, is that these facts
associated with b are not even true for O at the time it performs a measurement
on a. Following are principle of extended facts, they are only true for O at a
later time, when it can actually perform a measurement that would allow it
to acquire information on b.
This leads us to Bell’s inequalities. Bell has introduced his theorem as an
elaboration of the EPR thought experiment exposed above, but the theorem
is more focused on locality than on completeness: Bell introduces inequali-
ties that a theory must respect in order to be a local theory, and shows that
quantum mechanics violates these inequalities. Experimental tests of the in-
equalities have been performed since then (Aspect et al., 1982), which seems
to imply that any empirically adequate theory must be non-local. But is there
an unquestioned realist premise in Bell’s argumentation?
I will concentrate on what has came to be called “outcome independence”.
This criterion for the predictions of a theory can be expressed as follows:
Pw(β|A,B, a) = Pw(β|A,B)
Pw(α|A,B, b) = Pw(α|A,B)
Here, w is the wave-function from which predictions are made: the state
of the world according to the theory. A and B correspond to properties mea-
sured on the system at a space-like interval, and α and β correspond to the
outcomes of these measurements. In substance, outcome independence says
that the probability that an outcome is obtained should not depend on a dis-
tant outcome, but only on the state of the system from which the predictions
are derived (this means that there can be distant correlations only if they are
already encoded in the initial state).
Let us consider an observer O measuring A on one side of the setup, and an
external observer P performing measurement B on the other side at t. I will
assume that α and β can take value +1 or −1 with half probability, and that
the particles are entangled in such a way that these values must be opposite
at the end of the experiment. Then outcome independence is violated in the
following way. Take the statements:
– pa: there is an event (measured by O at t) with outcome +1
– pb: there is an event (measured by P at t) with outcome −1
According to quantum theory, we have P (pb|pa) = 1 and P (pb) = 0.5,
which, if pa and pb are separated by a space-like interval, violates outcome
independence.
In the context of RQM, these inequalities should be evaluated from the
perspective of an observer situated at the beginning of the experiment, that
makes predictions about facts and events for its future-selves. I will call O1
the future-self of O that measures the system at t and O2 the future-self of
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O that gathers information on P ’s measurement at t′ > t. This requires that
P at t and O2 at t
′ be separated by a time-like interval. The two statements
become:
– p′a: there is an event relative to O1 with outcome +1
– p′b: there is an event relative to P at t with outcome −1, relative to O2.
Following relativism, statement p′b must be relative to O2 because it corre-
sponds to extended facts that can only be deduced from information available
to O2.
The problem for transposing Bell’s inequalities to RQM is that the facts
that are predicted are no more absolute facts located at a point in space-time.
They can be located at a point in space-time, but they are also indexed to an
observer, which is located elsewhere. Typically, p′b concerns P at t, but it is
relative to O2 at t
′. And this is how Smerlak Rovelli (2007) pretend to solve
the problem of locality: since information on P must travel back to O2, and
since no information travels faster than light, locality is not violated.
This is rather intuitive, but itthe argument deserves a more precise analysis.
How shall we evaluate locality in RQM? What would count as a non-local
interaction in this picture? When are relative facts separated by a space-like
interval? There are three options:
1. Locate relative facts according to the event they describe, and keep Bell’s
criterion
2. Locate relative facts according to the observers they are relative to, and
keep Bell’s criterion
3. Take relative facts as asymmetric relations between two objects, and come-
up with a locality criterion taking into account both relata.
In the first option, RQM is non-local, because predictions concerning dis-
tant facts are statistically dependent, as in standard quantum mechanics, and
the relativity of facts is simply irrelevant. This solution (which would be what
we would have obtained in a relationist picture) seems unfit, because it does
not take into account the fact that facts are relative.
In the second option (which is what we would get in the deflationist pic-
ture), RQM is trivially local, because distances are simply irrelevant: only the
observer is relevant. This is no more tenable than the first option for the rea-
sons given before: there is no way any theory could be non-local in this picture,
even if people could act on distant objects at their will. Note that the fact that
extended facts are inferred from basic facts is not a sufficient reason to choose
this option: under a non-deflationist view, extended facts are not equivalent
to basic facts, and there is no reason not to take into account their position
in space-time.
So our locality criterion should involve both the spatio-temporal position
of the fact and that of the observer to which it is relative.
One could consider the following criterion: any fact relative to an observer
should be situated in its past light-cone. This means that an observer can have
no direct knowledge about distant events. In the case of EPR, P ’s measure-
ment result is not a fact for O1: it can only be a fact when O2, because P
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is in the past-light cone of O2. This seems reasonable, and it does justice to
Smerlak Rovelli’s treatement of EPR, where they emphasise the importance
of interacting for acquiring information. However, no statistical independence
between different facts is really involved in this criterion, and this condition
can be achieved only by specifying the interpretative rules from which ex-
tended facts are deduced from basic facts. Non-locality is stipulated rather
than specific to a given theoretical structure. One could violate this criterion
by allowing an observer to deduce distant extented facts from local facts (for
example, by allowing O1 to deduce P ’s measurement). So arguably, any theory
still could qualify as local if suitably interpreted (even if communication at a
distance is feasible, so long as the result can only be witnessed by a future
observer). The criterion seems insufficient.
One could observe that standard quantum mechanics, without the collapse
postulate, is a local theory. The difficulty here is that neither the wave-function
nor its dynamics have an ontological interpretation in RQM, so it is not clear
how this locality translates in this interpretation.
One could consider a criterion that mimics parameter independence, where
any outcome must be statistically independent from what the measurements
that are carried out at a distance (not their outcomes), along these lines: a fact
about a distant event should not depend on the measurements the observer
has performed so far, unless this was in the past light-cone of the event. Then
quantum theory would pass the test, but this has nothing to do with RQM
since quantum theory does not violate parameter independence, and RQM
does not solve any problem specifically.
Finally, one could recall the main motivation of locality: compatibility with
the theory of relativity, and build a criterion from relativity considerations.
This is perhaps the most sensible approach. But without a truth-relativist
interpretation of relativity theory, it is hard to tell what the resulting criterion
would look like.
There are perhaps other possibilities. In any case, Rovelli’s claim that RQM
saves the locality and completeness of quantum mechanics is hard to assess if
no truth-relativist criterion for locality is proposed. It provides a solution to
the EPR argument, but the way it would address Bell’s inequalities is unclear.
For this reason, I do not think that the issue is really settled.
5 Can we make RQM more realist?
The radical relativism of RQM, as understood here, brings some incomfort.
We could intuitively express the worry this way: the external observers that
an observer O knows about are not the real observers, they are mere observers
for O, and there is no guarantee that the real observer’s observations match
O’s predictions, even though the general (absolute) statements of the inter-
pretation assumes that there are observers and events.
Van Fraassen (2010) proposed some additional principles to tame this dis-
confort. In our context, this would amount to requiring that if something is
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true-for-O, then it cannot be false-for-O′, where O′ is any system containing
O (van Fraassen expresses this in terms of orhogonality of relative states): this
ensures a transcendental coherence between what different observers observe.
The problem is that these statements are already true in quantum mechanics,
from the perspective of any observer and given the relativist interpretational
rules of RQM, but perhaps they could allow inferences concerning what is
possibly true for an external observer. In any case, the whole picture is still
relativist.
In this section, I wish to briefly explore another possible way to alleviate
this worry: assuming presentism.
Indeed, the relativity of truth that characterises RQM, as interpreted here,
is mainly employed to eliminate non-locality when it comes to considering
predictions about future events, but it is unnecessary with regards to events
in an observer’s past light-cone, so one could well consider that these events are
absolutely real, or, at least, that it is absolutely true that they are real-for-O,
and eliminate the double-relativity of statements about others (on the ground
that other observers’ events are also absolutely real-for-them). This move does
not seem to affect the way RQM can answer the puzzles of quantum mechanics
if the principle is denied to potential future observers (because they do not
yet exist), and it has the capacity to put at rest most of the worries associated
with RQM: after all, we all live in the same world, because we all share a
common past.13
A problem with presentism is that it seems to require a preferred frame
of reference so as to have a well-defined notion of simultaneity, which is prob-
lematic with regards to relativity theory. However, another interpretative rule
could solve this issue by appealing to decoherence.
In this section, I wish to explore another possible extension of RQM, based
on decoherence.
First, let us recall the rationale for assuming that distant events should not
count as facts for an observer. Take the case of the EPR experiment above: why
does P ’s measurement counts as a prediction for O1 rather than a fact? This is
because O1 cannot directly measure P . In principle, someone could intervene
in the experiment and make a quantum measurement on P and the measured
particle that would (in colloquial terms) display interferences between the two
possible results for the measurement. This would have as an effect that there
would be no answer to the question “what did P see?”, just as in a double-slit
experiment, there is no answer to the question “in which slit did the electron
pass?”.
However, there are situations where such a scenario is implausible. Decoher-
ence is a phenomenon by which a system that interacts with an environment
becomes indistinguishable from a statistical mixture for a certain preferred
basis (Zurek, 2003). Quantum correlations in the system don’t really disap-
pear: rather they are, loosely speaking, diluted in the environment. Concretely,
13 There might also be interesting connections between relativist truth and the use of a
tensed semantic associated with presentism. See also Dorato (2013) for considerations on
time and becoming in the context of RQM.
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this means that measurements of the kind describes above become practically
impossible, because they would involve a finely tuned control of the environ-
ment. Now, (notwithstanding potential locality problems) that could be seen
as a reason to assume that “P has measured the particle”s spin-x” is a fact
for O1, because nothing could prevent any potential future-O1 from incorpo-
rating this as a fact. In sum, one could add the following principle to the ones
mentioned above:
Distant fact principle: if O can predict that a fact is true for all its potential
future-selves at a given time, then it is a fact for O now.
Our new interpretative rule means that an observer can infer extended facts
beyond its past light-cone. This also includes many facts situated in its future
light-cone: roughly all facts that can be predicted classically are concerned
(the position of planets for centuries), which means most macroscopic ones, so
long as they are not affected by unsettled micro-events. A problem with this
proposal is that it might reintroduces non-locality, depending on what criteria
one adopts. However, decoherence has as an effect to make the violations of
Bell’s inequalities less plausible (Levkovich-Maslyuk, 2009). The issue should
be examined in more details.
Combined with the presentism suggested here, our new interpretative rule
means that we have a (probabilistic) means to determine the existence of
absolute events outside of our past light-cone, i.e. an observer can know what
events are “present” or not, without having to assume a preferred reference
frame.
A problem with this proposal is that it probably reintroduces non-locality.
Decoherence can have as an effect to make the violations of Bell’s inequalities
implausible. However, at the beginning of an EPR, one could predict from our
new principle that P ’s measurement will be a fact for O1, and depending on
our locality criteria, this could be a mark of non-locality. Another issue is that
we could have to accept that many events in our future light-cone are actually
“present” (or at least that they are absolute facts about the future): roughly
all facts that can be predicted classically are concerned (the position of planets
for centuries), which means most macroscopic ones, so long as they are not
affected by unsettled micro-events. This also means that coarse-grained events
associated with wholes can be “present” while events in their parts at the same
time are not, and that micro-facts in our past are not yet “present” if they
have not decohered (all this is very counterintuitive, but not necessarily absurd
if “present” just means “settled fact”). So rather than a growing-block theory
of time, we have something like a solidifying-block theory, where solidification
(the process of events) is not uniform and is a scale-sensitive phenomenon. All
this looks a bit crazy, but in the end, these are only useful representations for
predicting occuring events. . . The main problem is that we lose a connection
between this notion of present and the notion of simultaneity in relativity
theory or in classical physics.
And of course, all this is hardly a fully-developed proposal at this stage.
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6 Conclusion
RQM is an inspiring interpretation of quantum mechanics, but an ambiguity
remains in the way it addresses external events. In this paper, I attempted to
make things more clear by considering three distinct options. Only one, radical
relativism about facts, can make the position distinct from an instrumentalism
while remaining faithful to the way the interpretation is formulated by Rovelli.
It can answer the EPR argument against completeness. However, whether (and
in which sense) this option provides a local theory is unclear as it stands.
In any case, I think the interpretation deserves more consideration than it
has received so far in the literature, and I hope this paper has contributed to
make it more clear.
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